Enhanced tier compliance document — Riverside Hall
Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Act 2025 (Martyn’s Law), section 7. Describes the public protection procedures and measures in place or to be put in place, and assesses how they reduce the vulnerability of the premises to acts of terrorism and the risk of physical harm if an attack occurs.
1. Responsible person and designated senior individual
- Responsible person
- Riverside Hall Ltd
- Type
- Organisation (company, charity, public body or other body)
- Company or charity number
- 01234567 (example)
- Contact
- operations@riverside-hall.example, 020 7946 0000
- Designated senior individual (section 10)
- A. Patel
- Position
- Operations Director (board member)
- Contact
- a.patel@riverside-hall.example
- Date designated
- 2027-01-15
- Day-to-day security lead (tasks delegated to)
- Head of Security (contracted security manager on show nights)
- Others with control of the premises, or responsible persons we co-ordinate with (section 8)
- Landlord (Riverside Estates) controls the service yard and car park; we agree access and CCTV sharing with them each year.
- The designated senior individual may delegate tasks but keeps overall responsibility for ensuring the responsible person complies (Home Office statutory guidance 8.69–8.71).
2. The premises
- Premises
- Riverside Hall
- Address
- 1 Example Quay, London E1 0AA
- Greatest number of people reasonably expected at the same time
- 1200
- How that number was assessed
- Licensed capacity of the main room (1,050) plus bar and foyer at peak, staff and performers; taken from the fire risk assessment occupancy figures.
- Schedule 1 use
- Entertainment and leisure (live music venue)
- Layout: buildings, entrances, outdoor and adjoining areas
- One building on two floors. Main entrance on Example Quay; two fire exits to the river path; service door to the yard. Queue forms on the pavement outside the main entrance.
3. Assessment of risk and vulnerability
The basis on which the procedures and measures below were chosen.
- Location and immediate vicinity
- Busy road on one side, river path on the other. Two bars nearby release crowds at the same time as our shows end.
- Who attends, busiest times and queues
- Mostly 18–35; doors open 19:00, peak arrival 19:30–20:30, egress 23:00 in about 15 minutes.
- Types of attack considered
- Marauding attack with knives or firearms; vehicle driven at the queue; an explosive device left in a bag or carried on a person.
- Vulnerabilities identified
- The queue on the pavement is exposed to traffic; the yard gate is sometimes left open during load-in.
- Advice and resources used
- ProtectUK guidance and e-learning; local counter terrorism security adviser visit (2026).
4. Public protection procedures (section 5)
Evacuation, invacuation, lockdown and communication procedures that staff follow if there is reason to suspect an attack is occurring or about to occur.
- Where the procedures are written down
- Public protection procedures, version 4
- Who can make decisions during an attack
- Duty manager; if unavailable, the head of security. Either may order evacuation, invacuation or lockdown without waiting for approval.
- Assessment: how the procedures reduce the risk of physical harm
- Staff can move people away from a threat within minutes: two evacuation routes away from the road, a safer area in the basement bar, and doors that lock from inside.
5.1 Monitoring
Measures to identify, observe and report suspicious activity, items and behaviour at the premises and in the immediate vicinity.
- Measures in place
- • Staff briefed to look out for and report suspicious activity, items and behaviour • Searches of people and bags • CCTV, monitored from a control room during opening hours Door supervisors search all bags at the main entrance; CCTV covers the queue and is watched from the office during shows.
- Measures planned (with target dates)
- • Security and perimeter patrols External patrol of the queue every 15 minutes from opening — by 1 March 2027.
- Considered but not reasonably practicable now — reasons and interim arrangements
- • Screening technology (for example walk-through or hand-held metal detectors) Walk-through metal detectors: no space in the foyer without blocking the exit; hand-held detectors used for random checks instead.
- Assessment: how these measures reduce vulnerability and the risk of physical harm
- Searches and active CCTV make it more likely a weapon or device is found before entry, and that suspicious behaviour in the queue is seen and reported quickly.
5.2 Movement
Measures to control, restrict or prohibit the movement of people into, out of and within the premises.
- Measures in place
- • Restricted access to non-public areas Back-of-house doors use key fobs; performers enter through the yard with passes.
- Measures planned (with target dates)
- • Queue areas away from roads and vehicle routes Move the queue inside a barrier line set back from the kerb — by 1 April 2027.
- Considered but not reasonably practicable now — reasons and interim arrangements
- — (none recorded)
- Assessment: how these measures reduce vulnerability and the risk of physical harm
- Keeping the queue off the kerb reduces exposure to a vehicle; restricted doors stop an attacker reaching staff areas.
5.3 Physical safety and security
Measures that strengthen the premises to reduce the impact of an attack, or deter and hinder attackers.
- Measures in place
- — (none recorded)
- Measures planned (with target dates)
- • Stand-off distance between vehicles and crowds Planters along the pavement edge to create stand-off — subject to council approval.
- Considered but not reasonably practicable now — reasons and interim arrangements
- • Vehicle security barriers (hostile vehicle mitigation) Permanent vehicle barriers need highway authority consent; discussed with the council, decision expected 2027. Meanwhile the queue is moved back (see 5.2).
- Assessment: how these measures reduce vulnerability and the risk of physical harm
- Stand-off and the barrier line reduce the chance that a vehicle reaches people queuing.
5.4 Security of information
Measures that keep information about the design, operation and use of the premises from people who might plan an attack.
- Measures in place
- • Social media guidance for staff and contractors • Plans, this document and security records stored securely Floor plans and this document are kept in a locked cabinet and an access-controlled folder; staff are told not to post about security arrangements.
- Measures planned (with target dates)
- — (none recorded)
- Considered but not reasonably practicable now — reasons and interim arrangements
- — (none recorded)
- Assessment: how these measures reduce vulnerability and the risk of physical harm
- Limiting what is published about our security makes hostile planning harder.
6. Training and licensing
- Who is trained to carry out the measures, and how
- All staff complete ACT e-learning on joining; door team briefed before each show on search and reporting.
- Roles that need an SIA licence (for example door supervisors, CCTV operators)
- Door supervisors hold SIA door supervisor licences; the CCTV operator holds a public space surveillance licence.
- Where training records are kept
- Training and drill log in the ohdock venue record
7. Review, the SIA and security of this document
- When this document is reviewed
- Every 12 months, after any incident, and after changes to layout, capacity or use.
- Next review due
- 2028-01-15
- Who holds this document and how it is kept secure
- Operations Director and head of security; printed copy in the locked office cabinet.
- A copy is given to the Security Industry Authority as soon as reasonably practicable after it is prepared, and each revised version before the end of 30 days beginning with the day of revision (section 7(2)).
- The procedures and measures are assessed and kept under review (section 6(1)), and this document is updated after significant changes to operations, use, numbers or layout.
- This document describes vulnerabilities of the premises: share it only with people who need it.
Prepared with the ohdock enhanced tier document builder. This document records the assessment, procedures and measures chosen by the responsible person; it is not legal advice, is not endorsed by the SIA and does not by itself show compliance. Check the Home Office statutory guidance and SIA guidance for your premises.